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 The strategy of having the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) take over the
 security burden from the U.S and NATO forces is
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 now a centerpiece of President Obama's
 Afghanistan policy. But as decision makers
 continue to push hard for a speedy
 "Afghanization" of the conflict, serious thought
 should be given to the current policy paradox of
 trying to rapidly expand an already
 unmanageable indigenous military force
 structure while aggressively pursuing informal
 security organs, namely static militias and
 various community defense forces.  And with the
 Afghan government's total annual revenue
 hovering around $1 billion and the Obama
 administration's budget request for fiscal year
 2012 of  $12.8 billion to train and equip
 Afghanistan's expanding army and national
 police force, it will be extremely difficult for
 Afghanistan to manage and sustain a force of that
 size and expense over the long term without
 protracted external financial and material
 support. Realistic expectations and level foresight
 regarding the physical limitations of these
 pursuits are required if any sort of security or
 stability equilibrium is to be achieved in
 Afghanistan before the eventual scale down of
 international forces in 2014.
 The U.S. handover of security responsibilities to
 the Karzai regime begins this July with a
 transition to ANSF predominance in the cities of
 Lashkar Gah in the south, Herat in the west and
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 Mazar-i-Sharif in the north and the relatively
 stable provinces of Bamyan, Panjshir and Kabul
 (except Surobi district). Afghanistan's national
 security services are increasingly viewed as the
 strategic fire escape to allow the scale-down of
 international forces preceding the larger
 withdrawal scenario.  The key instrument in this
 transition is the Afghan National Army (ANA),
 especially given the fact that the Afghan National
 Police (ANP) in many parts of the country is a
 hated institution because of their abusive,
 predatory and illegally extractive reputation.  The
 ANP in Kandahar, for example, are known to at
 times provide vehicles to local insurgents for
 kidnappings and assassinations.
 The United States has spent an astounding $18
 billion on reconstructing the ANA since 2002, but
 it remains difficult to get accurate numbers on
 the actual size of the force "present for duty," a
 fact that makes it difficult to gauge what
 condition Afghanistan's national force structure
 might look like in late 2011 or beyond.   
 U.S. Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and Jack Reed
 (D-RI) recently stated in the Washington Post
 that Afghanistan added "about 70,000 troops in
 2010," and that "the Afghans are on track to meet
 goals of 171,000 soldiers and 134,000 police
 officers by October [2011]," but a staggering
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 and leadership positions belie the veracity of such
 claims.  At the current attrition rate of around 32
 percent for the ANA (25 percent for Afghan
 police), only 70,000 of the 110,000 men that
 were recruited in 2010 remain engaged in some
 aspect of the national army according to U.S.
 Lieutenant General William Caldwell, the
 commander of NATO's training mission in
 Afghanistan.
 Again, according to Senators Levin and Reed, the
 Obama administration is currently considering a
 proposal that seeks to increase Afghan security
 forces by about 30,000 soldiers, and a similar
 number of police, bringing the estimated total
 Afghan security force levels to about 378,000 by
 the end of 2012. But is this goal even possible
 considering the available and qualified manpower
 pool?  And how was this level of forces decided
 upon?  Does this equate to some ratio of security
 providers per population or was this number
 pulled out of a hat?
 The Defense Department often uses the vague
 phrase of "trained and equipped" when referring
 to ANA troop strength in press releases, a number
 that is not the same as troops actually present for
 duty.  In many respects, the number of trained
 and equipped ANA service members is irrelevant
 because of desertion, attrition and other
 dynamics.  When one of the authors recently
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 asked a senior U.S. government manager
 involved in ANA training in Kabul what the
 official figure the U.S. uses when assessing those
 ANA "present for duty," it was answered that 75
 percent of the ANA force is assumed "present for
 duty" at any particular time.  When this figure
 was relayed by the authors to senior U.S.
 Government analysts, they were dumbfounded
 and suggested they believe that the number of
 ANA "present for duty" was much smaller -
 between 40 and 60 percent. 
 It is estimated that at least one third of the ANA
 evaporates every year through desertions and
 non-reenlistment. A member of the U.S ANA
 training mission in Kabul told the authors that in
 an unpublished report, the U.S. Army's Center for
 Army Lessons Learned (CALL) in Fort
 Leavenworth, Kansas, had a professional
 statistician analyze ANA growth and attrition
 rates in 2005. According to this same source, the
 report  concluded (p. 6) that the ANA could never
 grow larger than 100,000 men, because at that
 point the annual attrition losses would equal the
 maximum number of new recruits entering the
 force each year. 
 In addition to the quantitative problems faced by
 the ANA in fielding an adequate force, it is





Portrait of the Army as a
 Work in Progress
The Looming Robotics
 Gap
Can an American Soldier
 Ever Die in Vain?
ROSA BROOKS |  FEATURE 
MICHAEL C. HOROWITZ |  FEATURE 
ELIZABETH SAMET |  IN OTHER WORDS
 
Transition to nowhere: The limits of "Afghanization"
http://southasia.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/22/transition_to_nowhere_the_limits_of_afghanization[6/2/2014 12:10:10 PM]
 problems ranging from illiteracy to drug use and
 medical problems, to name but a few.
 Recruitment also  remains a particularly divisive
 issue as far as ethnic diversity and quotas are
 concerned. Officials from the Afghan Ministry of
 Defense, the United States Armed Forces, and the
 International Crisis Group undertook
 independent inquiries into the ethnic
 demographics of the ANA between November
 2009 and January 2010.  The "template"
 approved by the Ministry of Defense for
 recruitment use attempts to recruit based on
 ethnicity - maintaining that the ANA should
 reach a personnel quota of 42 percent Pashtun,
 27 percent Tajik, 9 percent Uzbek, 9 percent
 Hazara, and 13 percent others,  such as Arab,
 Baluch and Nuristani. The goal of using ethnic
 quotas to balance the ANA comes "even at the
 expense of quality," according to the Combined
 Training Advisory Group's U.K. Brigadier General
 Jon Watson, as reported in Jane's Defense
 Bulletin.  Rigid ethnic recruiting goals on behalf
 of the coalition and the Afghan government,
 ignores the socio-political and historical realities
 of Afghanistan, which include Western
 partnerships with non-Pashtun groups like the
 Northern Alliance and more favorable security
 environments in non-Pashtun areas that make
 recruitment and the retention of troops less
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 difficult than in places like Afghanistan's Pashtun
 south.
 Even with a seemingly balanced representation
 throughout the ANA according to the above
 ethnic breakdown, ethnic Tajiks still dominate
 the officer and NCO ranks. According to
 Afghanistan scholar Antonio Giustozzi,
 approximately 70 percent of Afghan kandak
 (battalion) commanders are Tajik, a legacy of the
 role the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance
 played in the fall of the Taliban in 2001.  Having
 one ethnic group dominate the leadership
 positions in an ethno-linguistically fragmented
 society has helped discourage certain other
 groups, especially southern Pashtuns, from
 joining the ANA, though there are a host of
 reasons explaining the imbalanced recruitment to
 ANSF.   
 Since 2005, amid a deteriorating security
 situation and increased Taliban presence
 throughout southern and southeastern
 Afghanistan, the Afghan government found itself
 battling against profound recruitment
 deficiencies among southern Pashtuns. Southern
 Pashtun families who sent sons to join and fight
 with the ANA were often intimidated, threatened
 and physically targeted by Taliban and insurgent
 factions, leaving other ethnicities and
 communities to fill this recruitment void. For
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 instance, in the southern province of Zabul, one
 of seven Pashtun-dominated provinces  suffering
 from a surge in anti-government activities, U.S.
 Embedded Training Teams (ETTs) indicated in
 2009 that only 5 percent of the ANA kandak
 responsible for the province was Pashtun.
  Furthermore, U.S. ETT personnel in Zabul
 estimated that 70% of all kandaks are
 commanded by Tajiks, a finding supported by
 additional field research conducted by the
 International Crisis Group (p. 20). Even in the
 Pashtun province of Zabul, there are only two
 Pashtun kandak commanders out of a total of six.
 Similar observations were found in most of the
 rural environs of Kandahar Province.   And in a
 2009 trip to Kandahar, the authors observed that
 in the Dand district many ANSF personnel passed
 themselves off as Pashtun to the local
 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),
 but were in fact Tajiks from as far north as
 Samangan Province, many of whom chose
 security positions in the south because the
 monthly salary topped security wages in the
 north.
 The lack of Pashtun participation has led to
 several controversial proposals, including a
 return to forced conscription and the
 mobilization of community defense forces, of
 which several pilot programs have already been
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 attempted, including the Afghan Public
 Protection Force (APPF) in Wardak and Logar
 Provinces, and the Afghan Local Police (ALP),
 implemented throughout many provinces
 including Kandahar, Uruzgan, Helmand and
 Kunduz.  But the organization of these programs
 often fails to deal with persistent questions such
 as how such informal security organs will
 transition into formal Afghan security forces in
 the future. Currently, there is no feasible plan in
 place to streamline the reintegration process of
 informal security forces into the national security
 structure, or to track the government-ordered
 demobilization of Afghan private security
 contractors, which collectively employed over
 40,000 armed individuals by 2010. The last thing
 Afghanistan needs is a reincarnation of
 mobilized, dysfunctional, well-armed thugs
 extracting and abusing local citizenry, as the
 warlordism and disparate militia rule of the early
 1990s was one of the primary reasons for the
 political rise of the Taliban in the first place!
  NATO and Kabul are both faced with a serious
 number of grievous limitations and challenges to
 this strategy of establishing and maintaining
 parallel security forces, as well as eventually
 transitioning these forces to central government
 control.  
 Moreover, as pressure mounts to increase the size
 of the ANA, looser vetting processes, shorter
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 military training courses and insufficient
 resources provided for coalition military trainers
 will only increase the pool of inadequate and
 unsatisfactory recruits culled from the lowest
 strata of society. These new recruits will
 undoubtedly include those already addicted to
 drugs, thieves, murderers and criminals.
   Training courses for new ANA recruits have
 already been reduced from ten to eight weeks for
 basic infantry requirements in light of the new
 expansion efforts. In contrast, as Lester Grau and
 Michael A. Gress noted in their book, The Soviet
 Afghan War: How a Super-Power Fought and
 Lost, during the Soviet-occupation of
 Afghanistan, drafted soldiers underwent a one-
month boot camp, and training for sergeants and
 specialists lasted three to four months.
 Additionally, logistics and clerical duties
 throughout the ANA are likely the weakest cog in
 rebuilding and reorganizing the force, especially
 given the endemic illiteracy rate that hovers
 around 90 percent among ANA personnel and
 staff. The lack of technical specialists and a
 "maintenance" culture is nothing new to
 Afghanistan. Currently, both ANA and ANP
 mentors report severe deficiencies in the Ministry
 of Defense supply system, referring to the system
 as a "fill or kill" process in which requests are
 made and then disappear. Even the top-rated unit
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 of the ANA, 1st kandak, 2nd Brigade of the 203rd
 Corps, indicated (p. 17) that their supply process
 is "a failure."  This deficiency simply increases the
 primary dependence of U.S. and NATO soldiers
 to remedy supply issues. Members of the ANSF
 often complain about where they will get their
 next meal, which begs the question of how they
 will get ammunition and other supplies when
 they are most needed.
 Additionally, an overemphasis by the
 international community to instill an infantry-
centric approach in rebuilding the ANA in a post-
Taliban environment has led to a severe shortfall
 in non-combat training, especially among
 specialists in logistics, supply and maintenance.
 Almost all logistic units have miserable Capability
 Milestone (CM) ratings (the metric used to
 determine combat readiness).  U.S. and NATO
 logistics mentoring programs did not begin until
 late 2008, according to findings by the Inspector
 General of the U.S. Defense Department
 published in 2009; further evidence that the ANA
 will not be able to support its own growth
 especially given the intense focus by NATO to
 expand the ANA.
 Naturally, there is no clear cut answer on how to
 best overhaul, maintain, and field an Afghan
 National Army given the current unstable
 environment and complexities regarding























 Afghanistan's larger contemporary conflict, now
 entering its 33rd consecutive year.   Although
 conventional wisdom suggests the ANA are far
 more professional and trained than other ANSF
 units, the ANA, Afghan government and NATO
 allies have a long road to travel before a
 professional, capable, and sustainable National
 Army emerges.   
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